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THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
Part II 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
This is the second of a two-part article examining 
the right of confrontation. Part II focuses on the rela-
tionship between the hearsay rule and the Confron-
tation Clause. 
In the absence of an exception, the hearsay rule 
prohibits the admission of evidence of a 
declarant's out-of-court statements if the state-
ments are offered tor the truth of the assertions 
contained therein. See Fed. R. Evid. 801; Ohio R. 
Evid. 801. If a statement is not offered tor the truth 
of the assertion, the hearsay rule is not violated. 
Nor, according to the Supreme Court, is the Con-
frontation Clause. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 
~ 74, 88 (1970) ("Neither a hearsay nor a confront-
ation question would arise had [the witness'] testi-
mony been used to prove merely that the state-
ment was made."). It should be noted, however, 
that the probability that a statement may be used 
by the jury to establish the truth of the assertions 
therein may trigger a confrontation issue even 
though the evidence was not technically offered 
tor that purpose. See Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 
(1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
Because a hearsay declarant is, in effect, a "wit-
ness," a literal application of the Confrontation 
Clause would preclude the prosecution from intro-
ducing any hearsay statement, notwithstanding 
the applicability of a recognized hearsay excep-
tion. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected 
this view. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 
(1980) ("[l]f thus applied, the Clause would abro-
gate virtually every hearsay exception, a result 
long rejected as unintended and too extreme.'.'). On 
the other hand, the Confrontation Clause could be 
interpreted as requiring only the right to cross-
examine in-court witnesses and not out-of-court 
declarants. This was Wigmore's view. See 5 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence§ 1397 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
Under this view, all recognized hearsay exceptions 
would be upheld in the face of a confrontation 
challenge. The Court has also rejected this view. 
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules 
and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed 
to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to 
suggest that the overlap is complete and that the 
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a 
codification of the rules of hearsay and their excep-
tions as they existed historically at common Jaw. Our 
decisions have never established such a congruence; 
indeed, we have more than once found a violation of 
confrontation values even though the statements in 
issue were admitted under an arguably recognized 
hearsay exception .... The converse is equally true: 
merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a 
long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the 
automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have 
been denied. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 
(1970). 
See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("It 
seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Con-
frontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule 
stem from the same roots. But this Court has 
never equated the two, and we decline to do so 
now."). 
In some cases, the Court has held the Confron-
tation Clause violated by the admission of evi-
dence that fell within a traditional hearsay excep-
tion. E.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (form-
er testimony exception); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400 (1965) (former testimony)_ In other cases, the 
Court has upheld the admissibility of evidence that 
did not fall within a traditional exception. E.g., 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (expansive co-
conspirator exception); California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149 (1970) (substantive use of prior inconsis-
tent statements). 
Thus, it can safely be said that the Court has 
not adopted either of the extreme views of the 
Confrontation Clause. Explaining what the Court 
has not done is a far easier task than explaining 
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what it has done. As one commentator has remark-
ed: 
Few tasks in criminal evidence are more perplexing 
than to describe the effect of the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment upon the hearsay 
doctrine. Signals from the Supreme Court point in 
different directions; the views of commentators differ; 
and while the subject is potentially as vast as the 
hearsay doctrine itself, benchmarks in the form of 
authoritative decisions are few and far between. 4 D. 
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 123 (1980). 
See a/so 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence ~800[04], at 800-20 (1981) ("The Court has 
not spoken clearly on confrontation issues, and a 
number of the opinions are difficult to reconcile"); 
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 772 
(1981) ("Today the relationship of the confrontation 
clause and the hearsay rule is to say the least con-
fused."). Perhaps the best place to start is with the 
Court's latest pronouncement on the subject, Ohio 
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
OHIO V. ROBERTS 
Herschel Roberts was charged with forging a 
check and possession of stolen credit cards. At 
the preliminary hearing, the defense called Anita 
Isaacs, the daughter of the owner of the credit 
cards and check, apparently tor the purpose of 
showing that she "had given [the defendant] 
checks and the credit cards without informing him 
that she did not have permission to use them. 
Anita, however, denied this." /d. at 58. At trial 
Roberts testified that Anita had given him permis-
sion to use the credit cards and check. On rebuttal 
the prosecution introduced Anita's preliminary 
hearing testimony. Prior to trial the prosecution 
had issued subpoenas, without success, to compel 
her attendance, and at trial her mother testified 
that her whereabouts were unknown. The Ohio 
Supreme Court held that the admission of the pre-
liminary hearing testimony violated the 
defendant's right of confrontation. State v. 
Roberts, 55 Ohio St.2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978). 
Tlie U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 
In Roberts the Court provided the following stan-
dard tor determining the constitutionality of hear-
say statements: 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause 
normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. 
Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be in-
ferred without more in a case where the evidence falls 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other 
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent 
a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworth-
iness. /d. at 66. 
Thus, the Confrontation Clause appears to require 
both the unavailability of the declarant and some 
indicia establishing the reliability of the hearsay 
statement. The unavailability requirement is a pro-
cedural requirement, manifesting a preference tor 
in-court testimony subject to oath, cross-examin-
ation, and jury observation of demeanor. The reli-
ability requirement is a substantive requirement, 
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evidencing a view that the Confrontation Clause is 
designed to protect against convictions based on 
unreliable evidence. See generally Westen, Con-
frontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified 
Theory of Evidence tor Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. 
Rev. 567 (1978). 
UNAVAILABILITY 
The first prong in the Roberts analysis provides 
that the right of confrontation "normally requires a 
showing that the [declarant] is unavailable." /d. at 
66. Explaining this requirement, the Court wrote: 
[l]n conformance with the Framers' preference for 
face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment estab-
lishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including 
cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), 
the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate 
the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it 
wishes to use against the defendant. /d. at 65. 
The preference tor in-court confrontation and 
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses has 
long been recognized by the Court. In an early 
case the Court stated that the Clause requires 
a personal examination and cross-examination of the 
witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not 
only of testing the recollection and sifting the con-
science of the witness, but of compelling him to stand 
face to face with the jury in order that they may look 
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand 
and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief. Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 
237, 242-43 (1895). 
See a/so Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) 
("The right to confrontation is basically a trial 
right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-
examine and the occasion tor the jury to weigh the 
demeanor of the witness."). 
Test for Determining Unavailability 
The test tor determining the unavailability of the 
declarant was first set forth in Barber v. Page, 390 
U.S. 719 (1968), in which the Court held: "[A] wit-
ness is not 'unavailable' tor purposes tor the ... 
confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial 
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain 
his presence at trial." /d. at 724-25. In Roberts the 
Court reaffirmed this test and added the following 
explanation: 
The law does not require the doing of a futile act. 
Thus, if no possibility of procuring the witness exists 
(as, for example, witness' intervening death), "good 
faith" demands nothing of the prosecution. But if 
there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative 
measures might produce the declarant, the obligation 
of good faith may demand their effectuation. "The 
lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce 
a witness ... is a question of reasonableness." ... 
The ultimate question is whether the witness is un-
available despite good faith efforts undertaken prior 
to trial to locate and present that witness. As with 
other evidentiary proponents, the prosecution bears 
the burden of establishing this predicate. /d. at 74-75. 
Because the extent of the effort that the prose-
cution must make in order to comply with the un-
availability requirement is a question of reason-
ableness, courts may disagree as to whether the 
standard has been satisfied in particular cases. In-
deed, Roberts presented such a situation. The 
Ohio court of appeals found the prosecution's ef-
forts to be inadequate under the Barber standard, 
_ while the Ohio Supreme Court reached the op-
' posite conclusion. State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St.2d 
191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978). Similarly, a majority of 
the Supreme Court held the unavailability showing 
adequate, but the dissenting Justices found that 
additional efforts could have been attempted. 448 
U.S. at 77-82. See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 
204 (1972). 
Reasons for Unavailability 
A witness may be unavailable at trial for a num-
ber of different reasons, each of which will affect 
the prosecution's obligation to produce the wit-
ness. Before considering the various reasons, it 
should be noted that if the witness' unavailability 
is attributable to the prosecution, the Confronta-
tion Clause would preclude the use of the witness' 
hearsay statements. See Motes v. U.S., 178 U.S. 
458 (1900). 
First, a witness may be unavailable because his 
present whereabouts are unknown. This was the 
situation in Roberts, now the controlling case for 
determining the diligence of prosecutorial efforts 
required in such a situation. See also State v. 
Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322, 415 N.E.2d 272 (1980). 
At the very least, Roberts establishes that the is-
suance of subpoenas alone is insufficient to satis-
fy the constitutional test. Second, the witness may 
&, be dead. In this situation Roberts indicates that 
I' "'good faith' demands nothing of the prosecution" 
(except producing sufficient evidence of death). 
See also Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Third, 
the witness may be ill at the time of trial. In this 
situation, a continuance may resolve problems as-
sociated with a temporary infirmity. See U.S. v. 
Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977); Peterson v. U.S., 344 
F.2d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. State, 40 
Ohio App. 367, 178 N.E. 325 (1931); C. McCormick, 
Evidence 610 (2d ed. 1972) ("A mere temporary dis-
ability appears not to conform with the standard 
established by Barber v. Page."). Another solution 
would be to take the witness' testimony in the pre-
sence of the jury at the hospital or witness' home. 
See State v. Lamonge, 117 Ohio App. 143, 191 
N.E.2d 207 (1962), appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 
545, 190 N.E.2d 691 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 
942 (1963). 
Fourth, the witness may claim a valid privilege, 
such as the privilege against self-incrimination. 
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167-68 (1970); 
U.S. v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1978); U.S. v. 
Wood, 550 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1976). Under these cir-
cumstances, it could be argued that the prosecu-
tion is obliged to grant the witness immunity. See 
t._·_ Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 101 n.2 (1970) (J. Mar-
!111 shall, dissenting); U.S. v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282, 
1286 (D.C. Cir. 1975); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio 
App.2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (1974); Westen, Confront-
ation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of 
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Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 
584-85 n.43 (1978); 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Fed-
eral Evidence 1070-74 (1981). 
Fifth, the witness could simply refuse to testify, 
notwithstanding the absence of a valid privilege. 
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167-68 (1970); 
U.S. v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v. Bailey, 
581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978). Such a witness could 
be held in contempt. See State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohi.o 
St.2d 201, 400 N.E.2d 386 (1980); State v. Antill, 176 
Ohio St. 61, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). Whether or not 
the witness' conduct is found to be contumacious, 
the refusal makes the witness' testimony unavail-
able. 
Sixth, the witness' testimony may be unavailable 
due to a lack of memory. This was the situation in 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See also 
U.S. v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977}, cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978). In this type of case, the 
. witness would have to be called, placed under 
oath, and examined as to the lack of memory. 
Finally, the witness may be beyond the sub-
poena power of the trial court. Barber v. Page 
makes clear that this ground alone is not constitu-
tionally sufficient. In that case the witness, whose 
preliminary hearing testimony was admitted at the 
state trial, was incarcerated in a federal prison in 
another state at the time of trial. The Court point-
ed out that 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) empowered fed-
eral courts to issue writs of habeas corpus ad tes-
tificandum at the request of state prosecutorial 
authorities and that the policy of the U.S. Bureau 
of Prisons was to honor such writs issued by state 
courts. 390 U.S. at 724. Because the prosecution 
had failed to use any of these means to secure the 
attendance of the witness, the Court found a con-
frontation violation. In a footnote the Court noted 
that "the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of 
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Pro-
ceedings provides a means by which prosecuting 
authorities from one State can obtain an order 
from a court in the State where the witness is 
found directing the witness to appear in court in 
the first State to testify." /d. at 723 n. 4. See also 
Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969); Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
One other case deserves comment. In Manc.usi 
v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), the defendant chal-
lenged the prosecution's failure to produce a wit-
ness, an American national, who was permanently 
residing in Sweden at the time of a retrial. In the 
absence of the witness, the trial court admitted 
the witness' testimony given at the first trial. The 
Court found no constitutional violation. 
Upon discovering that [the witness] resided in a 
foreign nation, the State of Tennessee, so far as this 
record shows, was powerless to compel his attend-
ance at the second trial, either through its own pro-
cess or through established procedures depending on 
the voluntary assistance of another government. ... 
We therefore hold that the predicate of unavailability 




federal habeas court was not warranted in upsetting 
the determination of the state trial court as to [the 
witness'] unavailability. /d. at 212-13. 
Despite the Court's attempt to distinquish Barber, 
Mancusi v. Stubbs appears to water-down the 
Barber "actual unavailability" standard because, 
as Justice Marshall noted in dissent, the prosecu-
tion never attempted to contact the witness in or-
der to secure his voluntary attendance. Stubbs, 
perhaps can be best viewed as an exceptional 
case, applicable only where the witness is in a 
foreign country. This view is supported by Roberts' 
reliance on Barber, not Stubbs, as the controlling 
standard in the typical case. It may also be that 
the type of hearsay admitted in Stubbs, former trial 
testimony, played a determinative role. Such testi-
mony is probably the most reliable form of hear-
say; it has been subjected to cross-examination at 
trial when the witness was under oath, and the 
transcript reduces the possibility of errors in trans-
mission. A less reliable form of hearsay may re-
quire a more demanding standard of unavailability. 
Both the Federal and Ohio Rules of Evidence set 
forth standards of unavailability for the purpose of 
applying certain hearsay exceptions. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 804(a); Ohio R. Evid. 804(A). Of course, these 
standards would have to be read in light of the 
constitutional requirements discussed above. 
Nevertheless, they do provide guidance and texts 
on those rules should be consulted. See 4 D. 
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 486 
(1980); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evi-
dence ,804(a)(01) (1981). For a discussion of the 
available procedures for producing witnesses at 
trial, see Western, Compulsory Process II, 74 Mich. 
L. Rev. 191, 283-89 (1975). 
The Exception 
Although the Court specified the unavailability 
of the declarant as a requirement of confrontation 
in Ohio v. Roberts, it undercut that requirement by 
using the word "normally" and inserting the fol-
lowing footnote: 
A demonstration of unavailability, however, is not al-
ways required. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 ... 
(1970), for example, the Court found the utility of trial 
confrontation so remote that it did not require the pro-
secution to produce a seemingly available witness ... 
448 U.S. at 65 n.7. 
In Dutton v. Evans the defendant and two 
accomplices were charged with the murder of 
three Georgia policemen. Williams, one of the ac-
complices, was previously convicted in a separate 
trial. The other accomplice, Truett, received immu-
nity and was the principal prosecution witness at 
Evans' trial. In addition to Truett's testimony, the 
prosecution offered the testimony of a man named 
Shaw, who had been incarcerated with Williams 
prior to the latter's trial. When Williams returned 
from his arraignment, Shaw asked: "How did you 
make out in court?," to which Williams responded, 
"If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex 
Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." 400 U.S. at 77. 
This statement was admitted at Evans' trial under 
4 
an expansive coconspirator exception to the hear-
say rule recognized by the Georgia courts. 
A plurality of the Supreme Court held that the 
Confrontation Clause had not been infringed 
because: 
First, the statement contained no express assertion 
about past fact, and consequently carried on its face 
a warning to the jury against giving the statement un-
due weight. Second, Williams' personal knowledge of 
the identity and role of the other participants in the 
triple murder is abundantly established by Truett's 
testimony and by Williams' prior conviction. It is in-
conceivable that cross-examination could have shown 
that Williams was not in a position to know whether 
or not Evans was involved in the murder. Third, the 
possibility that Williams' statement was founded on 
faulty recollection is remote in the extreme. Fourth, 
the circumstances under which Williams made the 
statement were such as to give reason to suppose 
that Williams did not misrepresent Evans' involvement 
in the crime. These circumstances go beyond a show-
ing that Williams had no apparent reason to lie to 
Shaw. His statement was spontaneous, and it was 
against his penal interest to make it. These are indicia 
of reliability which have been widely viewed as 
determinative of whether a statement may be placed 
before the jury though there is no confrontation of the 
declarant. /d. at 88-89. 
For present purposes, the critical aspect of Evans 
is the fact that the prosecution made no attempt 
to call Williams as a witness. The Court summarily 
addressed this point, stating that "the possibility 
that cross-examination of Williams could conceiv-
ably have shown the jury that the statement, 
though made, might have been unreliable was 
wholly unreal." /d. at 89. As discussed below, the 
standard for determining when the "utility" of 
cross-examination will be "so-remote" as to relieve 
the prosecution of the responsibility for establish-
ing unavailability is extremely important. 
The Federal and Ohio Rules of Evidence 
Traditional hearsay exceptions can be divided in-
to two categories: those exceptions that require 
the unavailability of the declarant and those that 
do not. Thus, Federal Rule 804 and Ohio Rule 804 
require that the unavailability of the declarant be 
shown before former testimony, dying declara-
tions, and declarations against interests are ad-
missible. With these exceptions, the hearsay rule 
itself demands a demonstration of unavailability. 
Thus, the unavailability requirement of Roberts will 
not substantially affect these exceptions, except 
perhaps to require a more demanding standard in 
some instances. Consequently, footnote 7 of 
Roberts will not be critical with these exceptions. 
On the other hand, Federal Rule 803 and Ohio 
Rule 803 permit the admission of hearsay state-
ments without a showing of unavailability. A num-
ber of common exceptions fall within this cate-
gory: excited utterances, business records, official 
records, and statements of state of mind and 
physical condition. The application of the Roberts 
unavailability requirement will presumably have a 
substantial impact on the admissibility of state-
ments falling within these exceptions. For ex-
ample, if the prosecution wants to introduce a bus-
iness record, the hearsay rule does not require a 
showing of the declarant's unavailability. Roberts, 
__ however, requires the prosecution to establish 
" unavailability- unless, of course, footnote 7 ap-
plies. It could be argued that in many cases the 
declarant would not remember the facts recorded 
in the business record and thus the utility of cross-
examination would be remote. See C. McCormick, 
Evidence 720 (2d ed. 1972) ("the inconvenience of 
calling those with firsthand knowledge and the un-
likelihood of their remembering accurately the de-
tails of specific transactions convincingly demon-
strate the need for recourse to their written 
records, without regard to physical 
unavailability."). It was apparently this view of 
business records that prompted Justice Harlan to 
write in his concurring opinion in Evans that "pro-
duction of the declarant is likely to be difficult, 
unavailing, or pointless." 400 U.S. at 96. On the 
other hand, if the business record is a hospital 
report of a physical examination of a rape victim, 
see State v .. Tims, 9 Ohio St.2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348 
(1967), it is not so obvious that the declarant would 
not remember the event or that cross-examination 
would be "pointless." Or, the business record may 
be an autopsy report purporting to establish the 
cause of death in a homicide case. Cross-
examination may be critical if the defendant's 
theory is suicide, rather than homicide. How does 
the trial court decide? Unfortunately, we have only 
Evans, which involved a rather rare combination of 
circumstances, as a guide. See also lmwinkelried, 
The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative 
Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 
30 Hastings L.J. 621 (1979). 
The Compulsory Process Issue 
One other aspect of Dutton v. Evans deserves at-
tention. In footnote 19 the Court stated: 
Of course Evans had the right to subpoena witnesses, 
including Williams, whose testimony might show that 
the statement had not been made. Counsel for Evans 
informed us at oral argument that he could have sub-
poenaed Williams but had concluded that this course 
would not be in the best interests of his client. 400 
U.S. at 88 n. 19. 
This footnote and the availability of the right of 
compulsory process played a crucial role in State 
v. Spikes, 67 Ohio St.2d 405, 423 N.E.2d 1122 
(1981), in which hospital records were admitted 
over a defense objection. At trial the prosecution 
offered no evidence establishing the unavailability 
of the persons who prepared those records. Never-
theless, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant's right of confrontation was not violated. 
In support of this conclusion, the court wrote: 
Prior to trial, defense counsel could have deposed the 
preparers of the reports. Grim. R. 15. Likewise, he 
could have subpoenaed those same people to testify 
at trial. Grim. R. 17 .... Rather, defense counsel made 
a tactical decision to do neither. Counsel for the de-
fendant, in Dutton, made much the same choice 
[citing footnote 19 of Dutton]. 
5 
The United States Constitution does not require 
that this court install a procedural safety valve which 
would permit criminal defendants to sit idly by at trial 
and during its preparation and which would decimate 
established and reliable exceptions to the rule against 
hearsay. Defense counsel did not pursue his options 
of discovery and compulsory process. Claims of con-
stitutional violations do not disguise the fact that 
defense counsel's choice of tactics determined 
whether the potential witnesses would testify. !d. at 
411-12. 
There are two flaws with this analysis. The first in-
volves Ohio Criminal Rule 15, which governs the 
use of depositions. Apparently, the Court was 
unaware that Rule 15, which was promulgated by 
the Court, does not permit discovery depositions. 
Rule 15 permits depositions only for the purpose 
of preserving the testimony of a witness. See Grim. 
R. 15(A)(" If it appears that a prospective witness 
will be unable to attend or will be prevented from 
attending a trial or hearing ... ). 
Second, and more importantly, the compulsory 
process argument, if accepted, would mean that 
the prosecution would never have to establish the 
unavailability of a declarant; it could always argue 
that the witness was unavailable because the 
defense failed to produce the witness at trial. As 
Professor Westen has noted: 
The danger here is that the defendant will find himself 
in a dilemma: if he stands on the claim of error and 
refuses to invoke his right of compulsory process to 
produce the witness on his own initiative, the appel-
late court may conclude that he never had a genuine 
interest in an in-person examination of the declarant; 
yet if the defendant tries to mitigate the injury by pro-
ceeding to produce and examine the witness on his 
own, the appellate court may conclude that the prose-
cutor's error was harmless. This dilemma is obviously 
unacceptable, because it would preclude defendants 
from ever successfully challenging a prosecutor's 
failure to take the initiative in producing a witness in 
person. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Pro-
cess: A Unified Theory of Evidence tor Criminal 
Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 623-24 (1978). 
Furthermore, there is no support for the Ohio 
Supreme Court's position in the U.S. Supreme 
Court's cases. Although the Court included foot-
note 19 in Dutton v. Evans, the Court's confronta-
tion analysis did not rely on that footnote. In Ohio 
v. Roberts the Court never mentioned the possibili-
ty that the defendant's failure to take steps to 
secure the witness' attendance at trial was a 
crucial factor. Indeed, the Court adopted the op-
posite position, casting upon the prosecution the 
responsibility of producing the witness. 
INDICIA OF RELIABILITY 
In addition to the unavailability requirement, 
Roberts provides that the "statement is admissible 
only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.'" 
The indicia of reliability standard is found in only 
two of the Court's prior opinions. See Mancusi v. 
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1972); Dutton v. 
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970). For purposes of re-
viewing the reliability requirement, the Court's 
cases are divided into three categories: (1) cases 
;I 
" 
in which the hearsay statement is subjected to 
cross-examination at the time it was made (prior 
cross-examination); (2) cases in which the hearsay 
declarant is subjected to cross-examination at trial 
(delayed cross-examination); and (3) cases where 
there is no cross-examination. 
Prior Cross-Examination 
The prior cross-examination cases involve the 
hearsay exception for former testimony, which in-
cludes preliminary hearing testimony, deposition 
testimony, and former trial testimony in the event 
of a retrial. The critical aspect of former testimony 
is that the opportunity to cross-examine the declar-
ant through counsel has been afforded. Moreover, 
the testimony is taken under oath and the tran-
script assures accurate recordation. Since, how-
ever, the declarant must be shown to be unavail-
able at trial as a prerequisite for admitting such 
evidence, the jury is deprived of the opportunity to 
observe the demeanor of the witness. 
It was the presence of the safeguards mention-
ed above that the Court found persuasive in decid-
ing the confrontation issue raised in California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). In that case, the wit-
ness, Porter, had testified at the preliminary hear-
ing, but claimed a lack of memory at trial. The 
Court upheld the admissibility of the preliminary 
hearing testimony. 
Porter's statement at the preliminary hearing had al-
ready been given under circumstances closely ap-
proximating those that surround the typical trial. 
Porter was under oath; respondent was represented 
by counsel-the same counsel in fact who later repre-
sented him at the trial; respondent had every oppor-
tunity to cross-examine Porter as to his statement; 
and the proceedings were conducted before a judicial 
tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of the 
hearings. /d. at 165. 
Because the right of cross-examination had been 
afforded and the witness' unavailability was not at-
tributable to the prosecution, the Court found 
"substantial compliance with the purposes behind 
the confrontation requirement .. . "/d. at 166. 
The Court had previously upheld the admissibil-
ity of former testimony in Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 
237 (1895). Mattox, however, had involved the use 
of prior trial testimony, whereas Green involved 
preliminary hearing testimony. Although the Court 
recognized that "the preliminary hearing is or-
dinarily a less searching exploration into the 
merits of a case than a trial," it did not find this 
distinction critical-at least not under the facts in 
Green. "In the present case respondent's counsel 
does not appear to have been significantly limited 
in any way in the scope or nature of his cross-
examination of the witness Porter at the 
preliminary hearing." 399 U.S. at 166. 
Although the Court upheld the use of former tes-
timony in Green, it did not apply the indicia of 
reliability standard. This is due to the fact that that 
standard was first used in Dutton v. Evans, 400 
U.S. 74 (1970), which was decided after Green. In 
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), however, 
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the Court employed the indicia of reliability stand-
ard to the admissibility of former testimony. 
Stubbs involved the use of former trial testimony 
at a retrial. After holding that the witness was un-
available, the Court stated 
The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure 
that there "are indicia of reliability which have been 
widely viewed as determinative of whether a state-
ment may be placed before the jury though there is no 
confrontation of the declarant," Dutton v. Evans, ... 
and to "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for 
evaluating the truth of the prior statement," California 
v. Green ... /d. at 213. 
The Court then concluded that these standards 
had been satisfied in Stubbs because there had 
been "an adequate opportunity to cross-examine 
[the witness] at the first trial, and counsel ... 
availed himself of the opportunity ... " /d. at 216. 
The Court relied on Green and Stubbs in holding 
that the preliminary hearing testimony in Ohio v. 
Roberts satisfied the reliability standard. The only 
distinguishing circumstances in Roberts were that, 
unlike Green, different counsel represented 
Roberts at the preliminary hearing and at trial, and 
the witness was called by the defense, rather than 
the prosecution, at Roberts' preliminary hearing. 
The Court found no significance in the change of 
counsel. Furthermore, after reviewing the record, 
the Court concluded that although the witness was 
questioned on direct examination, the "question-
ing clearly partook of cross-examination as a mat-
ter of form," 448 U.S. at 70, and there was no signi-
ficant limitation on the scope or nature of the 
cross-examination. 
Roberts also indicates that the reliability require-
ment does not demand an ad hoc evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the cross-examination in every 
case. 
We need not consider whether defense counsel's 
questioning at the preliminary hearing surmounts 
some inevitable nebulous threshold of 
"effectiveness." ... We hold that in all but such extra-
ordinary cases, no inquiry into "effectiveness" is re-
quired. A holding that every case involving prior testi-
mony requires such as inquiry would frustrate the 
principal objective of generally validating the prior tes-
timony exception in the first place - increasing cer-
tainty and consistency in the application of the 
Confrontation Clause. /d. at 73 n.12. 
--
See also State v. Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322, 415 
N.E.2d 272 (1980). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
did leave unresolved one issue concerning effec-
tiveness; that is, situations in which there is no, or 
only pro forma, cross-examination. "We need not 
deci'de whether the Supreme Court of Ohio correct-
ly dismissed statements in Green suggesting that 
the mere opportunity to cross-examine rendered 
the prior testimony admissible .... Nor need we 
decide whether de minumus questioning is suffi-
cient, for defense counsel in this case tested [the 
witness'] testimony with the equivalent of signi-
ficant cross-examination." 448 U.S. at 70. 
Delayed Cross-Examination 
Two of the Court's decisions involve situations 
in which the defendant was afforded the opportuni-
ty to cross-examine the hearsay declarant at trial. 
For example, the preliminary hearing testimony in 
"' Green was also admissible as substantive evi-
dence under California law as a prior inconsistent 
statement in addition to being admissible as 
former testimony. According to the Court, the 
presence of the declarant at trial "afford[s] the 
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the 
truth of the prior statement." 399 U.S. at 161. 
Under these circumstances, the witness is under 
oath, is subject to cross-examination, and the jury 
has the opportunity to observe the witness' de-
meanor. ld. at 159-61. 
Green, however, did leave one issue unresolved. 
In that case, the preliminary hearing witness claim-
ed a lack of memory when called to testify at trial. 
This factor, of course, undercut the defendant's 
opportunity to cross-examine at trial. Nevertheless, 
the Court did not explore this point. "Whether [the 
witness'] apparent lapse of memory so affected 
Green's right to cross-examine as to make a criti-
cal difference in the application of the Confronta-
tion Clause in this case is an issue which is not 
ripe for decision at this juncture." 399 U.S. at 
168-69. The Court remanded the case on this issue. 
In Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971), a code-
fendant's statement implicating O'Neil was intro-
duced at a joint trial. The admission of the state-
ment would have violated the Court's decision in 
! Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), but for the fact 
that the codefendant took the stand and thereby 
was subject to cross-examination. "We conclude 
that where a codefendant takes the stand in his 
own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-
court statement implicating the defendant, and 
proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant con-
cerning the underlying facts, the defendant has 
been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments." /d. at 629-30. 
In sum, Green and O'Neil indicate that delayed 
cross-examination of the hearsay declarant will us-
ually satisfy the reliability requirement. The most 
important impact of these cases involves the sub-
stantive use of prior inconsistent statements under 
Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(a). For a discus-
sion of this issue, see 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence§ 422 (1980); 4 J. Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~801 (d)(1 )(A)[04] 
(1979); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the 
Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 Tex. 
l. Rev. 151 (1978). 
Absence of Cross-Examination 
The previously discussed categories involved sit-
uations in which cross-examination occurred, 
either prior to trial or at trial. Unlike the former tes-
t~mony exception, however, most hearsay excep-
tions do not require cross-examination at the time 
the statement is made. Present sense impressions, 
excited utterances, statements of state of mind or 
Physical condition, business records, official 
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records, dying declarations, and declarations 
against interest fall into this category. Moreover, if 
the declarant is not available at the time of trial, 
delayed cross-examination is not possible. In this 
situation, there will be no cross-examination. 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), was such a 
case. In that case, the Court made an ad hoc eval-
uation as to the reliability of the hearsay state-
ment; the Court held that the lack of any memory 
problem, the spontaneity of the statement, the de-
clarant's obvious personal knowledge of the under-
lying facts, and the fact that the statement was 
against his interests were sufficient indicia of reli-
ability to satisfy confrontation requirements. 
After Dutton v. Evans, many courts employed an 
ad hoc approach to determine whether the reliabili-
ty requirement had been satisfied. E.g. U.S. v. Nick, 
604 F.2d 1199, 1202-04 (9th Cir. 1979); U.S. v. 
Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 917 (1979). See also 5 J. Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 1397, at 185 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) ("case-
by-case approach"); 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence 155-57 (1980). Ohio v. Roberts, 
however, indicates that an ad hoc review is not us-
ually required. After positing the reliability require-
ment, the Court wrote: "Reliability can be inferred 
without more in a case where the evidence falls 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other 
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least ab-
sent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness." 448 U.S. at 66. In another part of 
the case, the Court commented: "The Court has 
applied this 'indicia of reliability' requirement prin-
cipally by concluding that certain hearsay excep-
tions rest upon such solid foundations that admis-
sion of virtually any evidence within them com-
ports with the 'substance of the constitutional pro-
tection."' /d. at· 66, quoting Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 
237, 244 (1895). 
Thus, it could be argued that the reliability re-
quirement is presumptively satisfied when tradi-
tional ("firmly rooted") hearsay exceptions are us-
ed by the prosecution. This is Judge Weinstein 
and Professor Berger's interpretation: "It would 
seem, therefore, that the Court's test amounts to 
1) unavailability plus 2) traditional hearsay excep-
tion." 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evi-
dence 7 (1981 Supp.). The Roberts opinion, how-
ever, undercuts this interpretation. If the Weinstein 
interpretation is correct, the Court would have only 
had to point out that the former testimony excep-
tion, which includes preliminary hearing testimony, 
was "firmly rooted." Instead, the Court spent time 
in determining whether this requirement had been 
satisfied in Roberts. This suggests that a more 
searching inquiry is demanded, and after Roberts 
some federal courts have undertaken such an in-
dependent analysis of reliability. E.g., U.S. v. Iron 
Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 
S.Ct. 1709 (1981). 
This approach is also supported by the values 
underlying the Confrontation Clause. Assume, tor 
example, that a defendant's homicide conviction 




form of a dying declaration. In Roberts the Court 
cited dying declarations, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8, as an 
example of one of the hearsay exceptions that 
"rest upon such solid foundation that admission of 
virtually any evidence within them comports with 
the 'substance of the constitutional protection."' 
/d. at 66. Nevertheless, because the evidence is so 
crucial and the exception has "long [been] thought 
by commentators to be the least reliable form of 
hearsay," 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence 7 (1981 Supp.), it is difficult to imagine 
the Court mechanically upholding the admissibility 
of such a statement without an independent analy-
sis of its reliability. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 64 (1980) ("the absence of proper confrontation 
at trial 'calls into question the ultimate integrity of 
the fact finding process."'). 
Roberts also leaves unresolved the problem of 
determining which exceptions are "firmly rooted." 
A number of exceptions recognized in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence are clearly not "firmly rooted." 
See Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421, 427-28 (8th Cir. 
1982) (Rule 804(b)(3), statements against penal in-
terests not "firmly rooted"). Other exceptions, al-
though long recognized, have been considerably 
expanded by the Rules. See United States v. Iron 
Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 
S.Ct. 1709 (1981) (statement made for medical diag-
nosis). Exceptions falling into this category must 
be subjected to "a showing of particularized gua-
rantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts. 448 
U.S. at 66. 
WAIVER 
Although a number of recent cases have con-
sidered the waiver of confrontation rights in the 
hearsay context, the Supreme Court has yet to de-
finitively review this issue. In other contexts, how-
ever, the Court has provided a mixed answer. In 
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), the Court ap-
plied a stringent waiver standard, requiring the pro-
secution to establish "an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege." /d. at 4, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
8 
458 (1938). In other cases the Court has found a 
waiver by conduct. See Taylor v. U.S., 414 U.S. 17 
(1973); Allen v. Illinois, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). These 
latter cases have led some commentators to sug-
gest that a forfeiture, rather than a waiver, theory 
is a more accurate description of the Court's deci-
sions. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and 
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses 
Another One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99, 140-43 (1972). 
One of the leading hearsay-confrontation cases 
involving waiver is U.S. v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th 
Cir. 1982), in which the grand jury testimony and 
FBI interview statements of a witness were admit-
ted after the prosecution established that the de-
fendant had murdered the witness. 
We conclude that a defendant who causes a witness 
to be unavailable for trial for the purpose of prevent-
ing that witness from testifying ... waives his right 
under the Zerbst standard. A defendant who under-
takes this conduct realizes that the witness is no 
longer available and cannot be cross-examined. 
Hence, in such a situation the defendant has intelli-
gently and knowingly waived his confrontation rights. 
/d. at 630. 
The court also held that the prosecution has the 
burden of establishing such a waiver by clear and 
convincing evidence. /d. at 630-31. See also 
Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) ("The Con-
stitution gives the accused the right to a trial at 
which he should be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; but if a witness is absent by his own 
wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if com-
petent evidence is admitted to supply the place of .4 
that which he has kept away."); Black v. Woods, If 
651 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 102 S.Ct. 
164 (1981) (waiver due to intimidation of witness); 
U.S. v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (waiver due to intimida-
tion of witness); U.S. v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (waiver 
due to intimidation witness); but see Olson v. 
Green, 668 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1982) (prosecution 
must establish defendant's involvement with 
threats against witness). 
